Introduction

In the 60-80s in Soviet philosophy, there was a discussion about the relationship between the laws of various forms of motion of matter. The idea of ​​reductionism was proposed (Akhundov, Kedrov, etc.), that is, the reduction of the laws of biology to chemistry, and the laws of chemistry to physics. Reductionism proved to be untenable. The idea of ​​subordination of the laws of lower forms to the laws of higher forms was also put forward, but it did not find development. Indeed, are the laws of biology, chemistry or physics in a person subject to his will, can he cancel them? On the other hand, for example, quantum mechanics in entangled states supposedly "cancels" the special theory of relativity, and in black holes - and the general theory of relativity, at birth from a vacuum in a strong gravitational field of pairs of particles, particles are able to fly away from a black hole due to CP-symmetry. But in this case we are not talking about the confrontation of laws, but about the imperfection of theories.

At the same time, the very imperfection of theories indicates a limited understanding of the relationship between regularity and chance, and the inconsistency of reductionism indicates the impossibility of programming higher forms. And this impossibility, as it turned out, is already inherent in physics.

It is obvious that social consciousness is determined by social being; historical experience convinces us of the presence of this connection by thousands of examples. We are talking about both social conflicts and such a social being when manipulation of mass consciousness is possible.

It is worth pointing out that concrete historical connection between objective reality and the subjective world, which they are so diligently trying to eliminate. Namely: the subjective creative world turns out to be surprisingly not unique, on the contrary, standard, completely determined by market social relations.

At the same time, a person cannot be free 1) from the laws of nature that act "from the outside" 2) from such laws of nature that take place in anatomy and physiology (with systemic quality), as well as biochemistry and biophysics of the organism. In the existing paradigm, in terms of the laws of physics, chemistry and biology, the concrete being of a person, including both himself and him as a system open to society, seems to determine his consciousness.

Is this true? As Epicurus objected to Democritus, it is better to believe in God than to live in such a rigid fatal predestination. Do quantum and stochastic uncertainties give free will, are they related to it?

Attempts are being made to make the laws of the lower forms of motion dependent on consciousness. In this case, the question arises: can any lower regularity be considered a regularity, if it depends on the different consciousness of different subjects. The main thing is different: is the influence of consciousness on experience natural?

Kant's determinism

I will cite one of the Kantian cosmological antinomies.

Thesis: "According to the laws of nature, causality is not the only causality by which all phenomena in the world can be derived. To explain the phenomena, it is also necessary to admit free causality. " Where "free causality" comes from, Kant does not specify.

Antithesis: "There is no freedom, everything is done in the world only according to the laws of nature."

A mechanistic, Cartesian view of human nature was formed even by Locke, in a systemic form - by the French materialists Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach. Descartes (Cartesius) and further Lametrie presented man as a complex machine. Descartes reserved for a person the right to have a living, feeling soul, an incomprehensible substance, La Mettrie delivered a person from it, including the soul in a nature comprehensible in the distant future.

In his thesis, Kant takes freedom beyond the laws of nature. That is, it makes it either a "particle" of an indeterminate deity, or assumes the presence of another extranatural.

Many Soviet philosophers did not go beyond the framework of Kant's antithesis. For example, we are talking about challenging the substantial understanding of activity. Therefore, it is incorrect, because it is impossible to deduce the materiality of the social process from activity, i.e. able to unfold independently - as the law of inanimate nature - from the consciousness of the subjects implementing it. "... V. Zh. Kelle and M. Ya. Kovalzon," writes Momdzhyan, "are convinced that the concept of activity itself cannot be considered as an initial explanatory material, since activity itself needs to be explained, proceeding from no other substantial definitions, but from the essential connections of the social process itself. ... The authors believe that the materiality of the social form of movement cannot be understood (deduced) from activity as such, since it is a subjective phenomenon of social life, determined by its material factors (social relations). Hence the main argument of V. Zh. Kelle and M. Ya. Kovalzon: "Science cannot make a conscious purposeful activity the initial basis of social theory, because this basis must be something independent of the subject and his consciousness." it contains in itself all the basic processes and contradictions of social life.

The perestroika book "Dialectics of Social Development", published under the editorship of Kelle and D. A. Gushchin at LSU in 1988, also shows a lack of understanding of this problem; it is an eclectic mixture of mutilated Marxism with Western clichés about personal freedom, ecumene, etc. And even the drastic changes in the country in the late 80s added little to the understanding of social laws: economic laws, the laws of the relationship between the basis and the superstructure, the laws of communication between the mode of production and all other aspects of social life, the laws of the relationship between social life and social consciousness (I.I. Matveenkov), political laws, laws of the spiritual sphere, the so-called general laws that do not relate to either the basis or the superstructure, general historical laws operating in all spheres and all formations (V.P. Tugarinov), sociological - the laws of the structure, functioning and development of society (A.K. Ugledov), etc. [2]. 1991-1993 convincingly showed this.

How does Kant himself resolve his antinomy? As an idealist - in the regulatory application of reason. You can be afraid of electricity, but you can build a hydroelectric power station. In fact, it is a resolution into Hegel's conscious necessity, but taking into account practice. In a word, into Trotskyism-anarchism-quixoticism: in order to cognize and free oneself, it is necessary, as Mamardashvili put it in Cartesian Reflections, "to pass".

Hegel's determinism

Let us compare the Kantian point of view with what Hegel says: in its development, chance unfolds as a pattern, in turn, a pattern manifests itself by chance. In categories: the law is essential in the phenomenon. In the definition: "The kingdom of law is a calm reflection of the existing or emerging world" [3].

Further, in Hegel - "breaking off", in the expression of Lenin, and "twisting" of words and concepts in order to eliminate the absolutized, fetishized understanding of the law. Hegel opposes chance (external to reality) not immediately, but possibility (internal, potential reality). Opportunities are formal (everything is possible that does not contradict itself) and real. A real opportunity is almost the same as a necessity. In turn, the need is relative and real. Moreover, there can be only one real possibility, and not a variety of struggling opportunities (which, as social contradictions grow, are split into two camps). Hence the conclusion: everything that really is reasonable.

For Hegel, chance is only the outer side of reality. But this is just a detail. In fact, randomness is a necessary side of a regularity, "touching" the essence, as shown by stochastics, and in the microcosm - just an essence, as shown by quantum mechanics. Chance is not inherent in limiting consideration of the system. Such an accident, of course, disappears with the expansion of the consideration, it becomes a regularity. Randomness is a property of the substance itself.

I.e. the same event at each point is both random and natural, and not only in the sense of the development of events or in terms of expanding the boundaries of the system under consideration.

Consider, for example, an event such as a person hitting a car. On the one hand, the event looks completely random. It is hard to imagine that the confluence of the most varied little things that led to the catastrophe would be natural. If we deal with the so-called deductive method, with the help of which Sherlock Holmes discovered causal connections between phenomena, we will see, writes Svasian, that the chains of events were chosen by the detective quite by accident [4], which we will return to later. The reason in deduction is depreciated, becomes indistinguishable, coincides with the reason.

However, there is a statistical pattern that obliges passers-by to get hit by cars. Because there is a connection between passers-by and cars: they move in the same plane.

Now we will go beyond the "human-nearest environment" system and expand it with the "cars" system. In addition, we will take into account EVERYTHING in these systems. It seems that in the extended, refined system, hitting a car is inevitable.

For Hegel in the world, "everything is connected with everything" (he was not yet familiar with the special theory of relativity). Next, we need to expand it even more. Let's remember that the Universe can be closed. If the hypotheses of the multiverse are correct, there is still no way to compare.

What follows from this construction? Approximately the same conclusion as Hegel's: "Blind is a necessity only insofar as it is not comprehended in the concept ..." [5]. And freedom arises as the need is realized. A person in prison is imprisoned. But if he realizes the full gravity of his crime, then, according to Hegel, he will become free.

Spinoza

We return in time from Hegel to Spinoza because it was not Hegel, but Spinoza who brought the mechanistic understanding of determinism to its logical conclusion: "Possibility and chance are only shortcomings of our reason. … If people clearly knew the whole order of nature, they would find everything as necessary as everything that mathematics teaches "[6].

That is: having overcome the dualism of Descartes, Spinoza remains true to Cartesianism.

If Spinoza knew that the Universe could be closed, and that, in any case, its mass is not infinite, he would not have to turn to potential infinity, which a person, clearly, cannot fully cognize, not to mention the actual infinity. For Spinoza, the world contains an infinite number of things. But in order for everything in the world to move with absolute necessity, in the Universe "the same relationship between movement and rest is always maintained", nature preserves "an eternal, lasting and unchanging order" [Ibid., II, p. 514, 88]. And the Heraclitean "you cannot enter the same river twice," and the "deviations of atoms" recognized by Democritus do not concern Spinoza.

One ball moves because it is hit by another, and the other because it was hit by a third, etc., ad infinitum. Not only is a single cause not singled out in the chain of causes (hence, everything is accidental, Spinoza repeats Empedocles). There is also no connection between potential infinity and the singular. The main thing: the cause turns out to be only external, it does not lie in the substance itself.

Spinoza was accused of fatalism, but he fought a different fatalism.

Determinism in theology

I will cite the statement of one of the philosophers of the mystical direction in Hinduism, Ramacharaka (Atkinson): "... karma ... just a connection between cause and effect. ... A follower of Karma Yoga must first of all learn that a person is one of the units that make up the whole mechanism of life or its general scheme. ... We are far from being simple automata, of course, but our interests are connected with the interests of all mankind, and we touch all of mankind at some points. We must willingly put ourselves at the disposal of a Higher Power and we will make sure that such willingness can prevent friction and suffering. " [7]

Various religions, ranging from ancient Greek mythology (Moira, Tyukhe), ancient Roman mythology (Fortune), ancient Egyptian mythology (Termutis) and the concept of karma and Tao, adhered to the concept that the fate of man and the world is a foregone conclusion. Khayyam writes:

You and I are prey, and the world is a trap.

The eternal hunter is hunting us, driving us to the grave,

Himself to blame for everything that happens in the world,

He accuses you and me of sins.

This is how the world and the followers of Ibn Rushd understood the world, but determinism for them is not from God, but in nature, and since man is natural, his thinking and actions are rigidly determined, therefore, there can be no talk of any sin. (Curiously, for the Alawites or the Ismailis, on the contrary, free will is unlimited.)

In one of the teachings, the rabbi points out to his disciples a leaf that fell from a tree on a hot day and sheltered the ant from the rays of the sun. The rabbi claims that the Lord even cares for the ant. Although Maimonides bequeathed to recognize the existence of free will.

Nikolai Gogol was convinced that his fate was in the hands of God, but not doctors, and therefore refused to receive treatment: "If it pleases God that I still live, I will live ..." Theologian and historian Kartashev writes that Gogol "is repentant he rejected everything fleshly and starved himself to death in the exploit of spiritualism"[8].

In the views of Thomas Aquinas, fatalism reigns: not only man, but all things move at the will of a higher being.

For Luther, mechanistic determinism is absolute, free will is fiction.

The theologically-minded writer Clive Stays Lewis provides the reader with a mixture of subjective and objective idealism. On the one hand, he repeats Mach: "... we are not able to know anything, except for momentary sensations." He also repeats Kant: "you cannot grasp nature at all, you can only approach it, and even then not too much". On the other hand, it recognizes a person's ability to cognize the external world, but not in a scientific way. [9]. So, Aristotle believed that the soul is a property of the body, but denied this to the mind, according to Aristotle, mind is not the entelechy of the body, thinking is not the implementation, not the function of any human organ. Although even the Pythagorean Alcmeon considered the brain as the organ of thinking (today we can add that thinking is a somatic process as well). Of course, as a materialist, Aristotle recognizes that existence is thinkable, nature is displayed in a person, like a coin is imprinted on heated wax - therefore, being and thinking are identical. At the same time, Aristotle considers form to be primary.

Lewis ascribes to materialists-"natural believers" a lot of inadequate statements: "... no consistent naturalist can recognize free will". One thought becomes the cause of another because we see the foundation in it, he writes, denying that the connection between thoughts, the logic of the connection of thoughts is conditioned by the logic of the external world.

Lewis defines the writer (Dickens) as the creator of what is not in nature, his characters are only in the mind of the creator. For Lewis, there is no connection between Dickens's characters and nature. Lewis assigns the connection, logic, orderliness between human feelings, between natural phenomena to God and even considers quantum mechanics to be something extranatural [ibid., P. 155].

At the same time, not only Lewis, all idealistic philosophy rightly saw in the "dialectical" mechanism the weakness of the position of the materialists. She opposed the necessity of a changeable world, but completely subordinate to the laws of nature, not freedom of will, but freedom of choice. This is a tendency in modern religions, and an opportunistic one. In fact, the choice itself remains predetermined, ignoring the given choice is not encouraged. Of course, you can think of any activity as a choice. But in this case, emergence disappears, "inner anxiety" disappears, the non-existence of matter, discovered by Leucippus and Democritus, the world becomes mechanistic again.

Lewis even allowed man to have freedom of choice regardless of God's will.

Otherwise, it would be necessary, following Spinoza, again to mechanically lay inside matter itself, some activity, such as charge, spin, or, as for almost all particles, rest mass. It is even possible to lay down a "hidden" parameter, not in the spirit of finalism, but as a kind of potential possibility, on which idealistic thinking cannot decide.

Lewis cannot answer the question of where freedom in a person comes from. How this freedom unites with the material in man and outside of him. Look: as soon as we asked this question, we have already received the answer: if this "from where" exists, we immediately fall into the zone of determinism, the conditionality of freedom by some law of nature.

The ideologeme of choice does not get rid of the mechanism, since it is fictitious. In individual action, thinking does not construct several alternative, competing plans. On the other hand, the choice between two or more slave owners is not freedom.

Goethe and Toland

Opposing theological fatalism, Kant, like Spinoza, substantiated natural fatalism. Thanks to Spinoza, Galileo, Hooke, Newton, Laplace, Huygens, the dialectical Leibniz and many other geniuses, Cartesianism and mechanism spread throughout the world, to physics, chemistry, biology, society, and individuality.

Johann Goethe is considered in a sense to be the antipode of Kant - in the sense that, in opposition to the "mathematical" type of cognition, he proclaims intuitive cognition.

Nevertheless, Goethe was the same mechanist as Kant. His "intuitionism" is ahistorical. Here is Goethe's formula: "Nature! We are surrounded and embraced by it and can neither get out of it, nor penetrate deeper into it. …Its laws are obeyed even when they are opposed; even then they act in accordance with it when they want to act against it…» [10]

That is - quixoticism is also natural. Thus, we are all programmed, if not by God, then by nature.

Marxism is against crude objectivism, but Marx's objection is not formulated. It concerns only the laws of the social form of movement, to which we will return. Or is there no free will, but it is simply impossible in principle to predict his behavior? For example, in stochastics, at the very beginning of the movement, we immediately find ourselves either in the zone of predictive "determinism" or in the zone of "indeterminism".

But we obviously cannot change the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, we are completely subordinate to them. Even our resistance will be generated by the same laws. But here we find a phenomenon that completely contradicts this subordination: chemistry is not reduced to physics, biology to chemistry and physics, social dynamics to natural sciences.

The question is - what then is the pattern? Is the question correctly asked, is it not itself a reflection of our incorrect, crude understanding of nature, such as, for example, the question into which of the holes in the first screen a particular electron flew in before the interference pattern formed on the second screen? Do we have enough categorical apparatus?

Spinoza did not bother to make even motion an attribute of matter. This was done after him by Toland: "I affirm that motion is an essential property of matter, in other words, it is as inseparable from nature as impenetrability and extension are inseparable from it ... I deny that matter is or has ever been an inactive, dead lump ... " [11].

In Ireland XVII-XVIII, it was not known that, say, an electron has no extension (this would contradict the special theory of relativity, an electron has a spin, it rotates, on the surface of an electron the speed would be greater than the speed of light), that the volume of atoms is basically, vacuum, all the more they did not know that vacuum is not emptiness at all. Note, however, that Toland has no first impulse, no deism, no God. No party, no order of the Swordsmen pushes matter from the outside. Bernstein, Lenin for a short time (in the only work "What to do"), the generalists of the Stalinist school, and even B. Porshnev in "Social Psychology", returned to the mechanism of Spinoza, they presented the working class as a motionless, unchanging lump, dark, inert matter for centuries. in need of a guide, a shepherd who brings political consciousness to her. Porshnev also absolutizes the role of the leader. As Ortega y Gasset put it in his book The Rise of the Masses, not everyone can rule, but only a special caste of people who "hear the underground rumble of history".

And we see how a person resists this mechanism - absenteeism is growing all over the world, not as a lack of citizenship, but as an objection to useless, discredited parties, as a natural desire of a person to learn about the world, to be different from an animal, to think and act independently, and not by party resolutions.

It would seem that Goethe is an idealist, an "intuitive" mechanist. " But it is Goethe, unlike Schelling, who brings into play the critical category - development. According to Engels, it is an ascent from simple to complex. Stalin adds: from the lowest to the highest. As opposed to transformism, as opposed to the version of the Ecclesiastes cycle implemented today in superstring M-theory.

Hegel, on the other hand, has something with which to correct Hegel.

For example, billiards with friction is a system where not only Newton's laws, but stochastics apply. The point is that small deviations from the initial conditions, even in classical systems, can lead to large deviations from the final design point. These deviations of the initial conditions can produce random perturbations, fluctuations. I.e. you cannot write an equation of motion that will unambiguously indicate the destination.

But we don't need to know if the deviation has occurred or not. After all, we are talking about determinism, causality, we can imagine a similar calculation of fluctuations. And so on to the quantum level, where the coordinate and momentum cannot be determined exactly at the same time. Nature is such that, trying to define it, we misunderstand nature, we ask the wrong questions.

In an experiment with interference, we fire electrons at a screen with two holes. There is another screen behind this screen, and an alternation of maxima and minima of the electron density appears on it. If we install a device that detects which hole the electron flew into, the interference pattern disappears. One maximum arises, the usual probability distribution of the electron density. Soviet philosophers at one time had a sharp rejection of such determinism, the "materialists" argued that with the development of science, mankind will know into which hole the electron flew. The impossibility of "knowing" and such an understanding of causality is incorrect because we proceeded from an unshakable, unchanging substance, and in Hegel's dialectic, due to immanent "inner anxiety," it changes from itself, not only under the influence of the external.

Social form

As we found out above, Hegel was mistaken in taking out the source of chance outside of substance. That is, I considered only one manifestation of randomness. Secondly, his understanding of freedom is contemplative, he ignores material historical practice. Historical materialism addresses it.

"Since Marx," Heidegger writes, "by comprehending alienation, penetrates into the essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history surpasses other historical theories. Since, on the contrary, neither Husserl nor, as far as I can see, Sartre recognize the importance of the historical aspect in being, to the extent that neither phenomenology nor existentialism reach the dimension within which a productive dialogue with Marxism becomes possible for the first time "[12]. That is why Lenin asserts: practice is higher than theory.

Is this assertion a return to Kantian regulation, to the use of regularity either for good, or for evil, or not? Does not the will, the individual "I" disappear at the same time?

The difference between the laws of the social form of motion of matter and the laws of physical, chemical and biological forms is obvious. The point is that parameters such as, for example, value are involved in the "mechanics" of society. But, unlike mass or charge, value, as Marx noted, is not an immanent, intrinsic property of a commodity. It is contained only in the heads of people. Accordingly, all social laws, as Engels wrote, are realized only through people, through their will.

Nevertheless, Marx, like Hegel and Kant, in their assessment of the laws in history proceeded from the Cartesian, Newtonian picture of the world, since there was no other. And only in the last quarter of the 20th century physicists apologized to the world community for misleading the world community with their mechanistic picture of the world.

In 1986, Sir James Lighthill, who later became President of the International Union of Pure and Applied Mathematics, apologized on behalf of his colleagues for the fact that "for three centuries the educated public was deceived by the apology of determinism based on Newton's system, whereas, at least since 1960, that this determinism is an erroneous position "[13].

Quantum mechanics, synergetics (stochastics, theory of singularities, theory of catastrophes) dictate quite rigidly the need to take a step forward from the materialistic understanding of determinism in history. It is about the opposite: to make the latest discoveries in the natural sciences the property of historical materialism. Such an agenda was formulated in 1995 (see, eg. [14]) several years before Wallerstein.

Moreover: it is necessary to understand what follows from the "non-materiality" of social law. So far, it is clear, at least, that the variability of the material social law is qualitatively higher than in quantum mechanics or stochastics - for the indicated reason of its existence only in the minds of people. After all, material conditions by themselves (tools, objects of labor, etc.) outside of society do not produce any laws. Under the perverted form of the tendency in physics to the primacy of geometry (see, for example, Wheeler's Geometrodynamics), one should see the need for a greater understanding of the ideal, the subjective.

How does social law work? For example, the operation of the law of supply and demand, as noted by Ricardo, is limited by a monopoly. Including monopoly (as in the USSR) limits the game of the law of value, for example, in relation to such a commodity as labor. The limitation is also imposed by the institution of life employment legally introduced by the state - in Japan, until 1991. Even this or that activity of the trade unions, as Marx emphasized in Capital, modifies the law of value.

Hobbes wrote that a person's "choice" is just a random combination of certain feelings that do not depend on the person. Following Hobbes, Marx states in the theses about Feuerbach: personality is the totality of social relations.

Schelling, constructing God from the categories of being, essence and existence, defined the essence of God as identity with being, the ability to contain the basis. And the existence of God is in distinction from the basis (see [15]). It is easy to see that in Schelling's definition Marx put man instead of God, and social being instead of abstract being.

It remains only, as if, in social life to distinguish between class-in-itself and class-for-itself, so that the "destruction of the working class" would lead not to disintegration, but to synthesis - "human society."

"The material of labor" (Engels) is not only "everything that exists", but man himself. This forms in him a non-biological need for labor (satisfaction of biological needs is a condition), if labor is creative, and the need to avoid labor (Marx), if labor is depersonalizing.

The contradiction lies in the division of labor, the driving force is the need to move away from depersonalization (for example, the strike in the United States against the conveyor system in the late 60s) and the need for creativity, which is limited by existing social relations. Both of them to this day are not manifested at the level of the universal.

However, it is clear that the definitions of Hobbes-Schelling-Marx are at the same time the essence of the definition of the social form of motion of matter, higher in relation to the lower, and any. For an individual, on the contrary, the definition should be inverted: the s i d e (not two or poly-essences!) Of essence - in distinction with activity, with social relations, and existence - in identity with social being.

Just a side - because the phenomenon of human uniqueness is still not revealed. And it cannot be revealed.

The point is not only that human creativity within the framework of dominant idealism is ontologically understood as a manifestation of the supernatural. In this case, life exists forever, it is she, as the highest form, in the spirit of Augustine that determines time (duration, according to Bergson), and the relation "subject - object" is understood in a finalist way, identical with the present historical moment.

Disclosure of uniqueness through "awareness of oneself", through self-awareness slightly adds to the distinction of human uniqueness (especially since self-isolation, the ability to self-organize exists not only in social, but also in biological, chemical and even hydrodynamic systems, which is described within synergetics by nonlinear equations of the Hadronov type).

The impossibility of disclosure is associated at least with the absence of phenomenological material in biology, where the difference between living matter and inanimate matter has not yet been comprehended, that is, the previous step has not been completed.

It is only clear that the uniqueness of the "I", which can influence social laws, but is unable to change the laws of its basis (they, if they change, then independently), is essential and cannot be understood within the framework of social, biochemical or physical determinism.

The second aspect is not freedom from the laws of nature - the impossibility for a person to change the laws of nature. Which, as indicated in the introduction, is being questioned. On the other hand, the inconsistency of the concepts of reality is emphasized. But this discrepancy is a law that by no means puts a ban on the scientific approach. "The approach of the mind ... to a separate thing, making a cast (= concept) from it is not a simple, immediate, mirror-dead act, but a complex, bifurcated, zigzag-like one, which includes the possibility of fantasy flying away from life; moreover: the possibility of transformation (and, moreover, an imperceptible, unrecognizable transformation by a person) of an abstract concept, an idea into a fantasy ... For even in the simplest generalization, in the most elementary general idea ... there is a certain piece of fantasy.)"[16].

"The most decisive refutation," writes Engels, "of these, like all others, philosophical quirks lies in practice, in experiment and in industry" [17].

"The question of whether human thinking possesses objective truth," emphasizes Marx, "is not at all a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice, a person must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute about the validity or invalidity of thinking, isolated from practice, is a purely scholastic question" ("Theses on Feuerbach").

At the same time, the question of the conformity of concepts to reality is by no means idle. Each concept is internal contradictory, it cannot be considered statically, the manifestation of the contradiction of the concept in scientific practice is a sure sign that the content of the concept will be replaced by a qualitatively new one.

If a person is a set of social relations, this means that a society consisting of machine people is doomed to follow its unchanging laws. In this case, a person acts as an abstract point of intersection of social lines, the word "concrete" does not distinguish a person with social relations.

The source of fatal predetermination is the dominant abstract content in labor, which also limits concrete labor.

Identity of thinking and being

It means that thinking reflects the external world, corresponds to it, that is, the world is knowable. Objective idealists also agree with this.

Let's note the obvious points. Of course, 1) thinking is ideal, therefore it is opposite to being; 2) thinking is not only abstract, but also intuitive.

At the same time, thinking is not identical with being in the literal sense. Landau and Peierls proved theoretically that two-dimensional crystals cannot exist because they are unstable. However, the experimenters then created graphene.

But cases of non-identity are natural. Consequently, the non-identity of thinking with being also has a general character.

For example, Ilyenkov, understanding law and determinism fatalistically (like Labriola, Plekhanov, D. Lukach, Stalin or Trotsky, but not Marx or Lenin), did not see the general content in the "insignificant" deviations, in their specifics.

But that's not all.

Thinking is not simultaneously identical with being, not in the Kantian sense of the thing-in-itself, not in the sense of imprecision (subjectivity) and not in the sense of ideality. In any process of abstraction, a new content arises, which both includes reality and does not include it, instead it includes something that does not seem to belong to reality. The classical equations of motion make it possible to predict reality, but they contain the reversibility of time and "travel to the future" that do not exist in nature. Namely: in those processes of which they are abstracts. Delayed and advanced solutions in these processes have a completely clear physical meaning, but they are a reflection of the deep general symmetry of physical laws. The contradictions that arise in connection with theoretical time travel are the sources of further development of the theory.

Secondly, thinking also reveals what has not yet been realized in the world, what it cannot display - not only actual, but also hidden in potency. Of course, thinking does this on the basis of the previous identity with being. "This supplying disclosure of everything can be carried out only to the extent that a person, for his part, is already involved in the extraction of natural energies in advance. If a person is involved in this, put on it, then does not a person - even more primordial than nature - belong to the being-in-existence? " - asks Heidegger [18].

But in this autopsy, there is something that was not contained in the basis. At least on the simple basis that subjective reality develops not only thanks to objective reality, but also, to a certain extent, independently.

Consequently, free will exists and is realized in thinking. And in activity?

Conclusion

Of course, free will is not something that is excreted, like the liver is bile, at the same time it is not something extra-natural. It is, like thinking itself, only the presence of a new systemic quality, limited by the lower forms of movement.

At the same time, embedding in the freedom of will in the Procrustean bed of regularity, including the quantum-stochastic one, is an incorrect task. For not just mechanism is limited, but on the whole "causality (causality, B.I.), which we usually understand, is only a small part of the universal connection. [19].

Abstract analysis is certainly important, but it is not the main task.

In science, Marx argues, there is nothing but its practical application. The task is not to explain, but to change the world. The practical conclusion, although trivial, has not yet been comprehended, for example, by representatives of political parties: freedom of will can be realized only when the abstract content of labor ceases to dominate in social relations.

1. K. Kh. Momdzhyan. Categories of historical materialism: consistency, development. M.: MSU. - 1986. - P. 66-67.

2. V. V. Frolov. Social laws under socialism. M.: Higher school. - 1990.

3. Hegel G. Op. M. - L.: Thought. - 1929-1959. - V.5. - P 602.

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